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SUSPENDED FOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, NOW 
WHAT?—THE SIXTH CIRCUIT SPLITS FROM THE 
SECOND ON A PLEADING STANDARD FOR 
REVERSE TITLE IX ACTIONS 
Thomas Campbell* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It should not come as a surprise that sexual assault on college campuses has 
been a major area of concern in the past decade. In 2011, the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) released the “Dear Colleague Letter” 
(the Letter) to all colleges and universities that receive federal aid.1 The Letter laid 
out in detail OCR’s interpretation of Title IX and how universities should handle 
sexual misconduct allegations.2 Title IX states, “No person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”3 Included as part of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, Title IX strengthened protections against sex 
discrimination in federally funded education programs and activities.4 
The Letter proposed guidelines to university administrators for evidence 
standards, adjudication procedures, and notice requirements to the accused 
under Title IX for sexual misconduct allegations on campus.5 The Letter also 
repeatedly reminded universities that failure to comply with OCR’s interpretation 
of Title IX could result in forfeiture of federal financial aid assistance.6 In response 
to the Letter, some universities intensified their stance on sexual misconduct 
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 1. See Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn 
Ali, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9AVV-X34R] [hereinafter DCL]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 4. See id. 
 5. See DCL, supra note 1, at 6–13. 
 6. See id. at 1, 6, 11, 14, 16, 19. 
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prevention at least in part out of fear of having their federal funding reduced or 
taken away completely.7 The culmination of the Letter, universities’ responses to 
it, and a heightened societal intolerance for sexual misconduct have inadvertently 
increased “reverse discrimination” claims against universities in which male 
students claim they were unfairly suspended following sexual misconduct 
accusations by female students.8 
II.  TITLE IX CLAIM IN DOE V. MIAMI UNIVERSITY 
In Doe v. Miami University, a suspended student filed a lawsuit against the 
university, claiming gender discrimination because he was a male accused of 
sexual assault.9 The allegations in Doe v. Miami University were stereotypical of this 
type of “reverse” Title IX claim. Two college students became intoxicated and, at 
the end of the night, engaged in some sort of sexual activity. In this particular 
case, the parties disputed as to when consensual sexual contact crossed the line to 
sexual assault.10 This led to a university adjudication hearing that ultimately found 
“John”11 responsible for sexual assault and in violation of the university’s code of 
conduct.12 The panel sanctioned John “by suspending him for three terms—fall, 
winter, and spring.”13 John twice appealed the hearing panel’s decision to the Vice 
President of Student Affairs, who ultimately affirmed the panel’s “finding of 
responsibility, but reduced his suspension period” to two semesters instead of 
three.14 After exhausting the university appeals process, John was out of options 
to attempt to clear his name. John brought a Title IX claim in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the university and several 
campus administrators involved in his campus hearing.15 John’s complaint alleged 
multiple theories of recovery under Title IX, including a university-created hostile 
environment in the adjudication process, a deliberate indifference to the gender 
discrimination he faced, and an erroneous outcome because of gender bias.16 The 
district court granted the university’s motion to dismiss on all of John’s claims 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).17 John then appealed the district 
court’s judgment to the Sixth Circuit.18 The Sixth Circuit partially affirmed the 
lower court’s ruling, splitting with the Second Circuit in refusing to adopt its sister 
 
 7. See Colleges Slammed with Lawsuits from Men Accused of Sex Crimes, CBS NEWS (last updated 
Mar. 23, 2016, 2:51 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colleges-slammed-with-lawsuits-from-men-
accused-of-sex-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/S7XL-QYTV]. 
 8. Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. Wash. Univ., No. 4:19 CV 300 (JMB), 2020 WL 353587 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 
21, 2020). 
 9. Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 584 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 10. Id. at 592. 
 11. The district court granted John’s motion to allow the parties to use pseudonyms. Id. at 584 
n.1. 
 12. Id. at 587. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 588. 
 15. Id. at 584. 
 16. Id. at 589–95. 
 17. Id. at 588 (citing Doe v. Miami Univ., 247 F. Supp. 3d 875, 896–97 (S.D. Ohio 2017), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018)). 
 18. Id. 
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court’s modified pleading standard for Title IX claims.19 The Sixth Circuit 
decision effectively resulted in dismissal of the majority of John’s claims against 
the university because he could not meet the pleading standard.20 Unfortunately, 
this situation is not uncommon. The general trend is for courts to dismiss reverse 
Title IX claims, like John’s, at the pleading stage because the plaintiff fails or is 
unable to plead facial plausibility.21 
III.  REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARD 
In order to analyze this trend of dismissals, it is important to understand the 
standard most federal courts apply in reverse Title IX lawsuits. In 2007, the 
United States Supreme Court did away with what is commonly referred to as 
“notice pleading” and established a new framework of “plausibility pleading” in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.22 The Court explained that a complaint requires 
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 
a cause of action will not do.”23 In 2009, the Supreme Court took its pleading 
standard one step further in its Iqbal decision, stating “Rule 8 . . . does not require 
‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”24 The Court clarified its position at 
the motion-to-dismiss stage, declaring that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, 
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” and that “[a] claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”25 
The process for applying this standard after Twombly and Iqbal is a two-pronged 
approach and, as the Iqbal Court put it, a “context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”26 First, a 
court must identify the conclusory statements in the pleadings because such 
statements “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”27 Then a court must 
decide whether the factual allegations (essentially what is left over after the court 
strikes the conclusory statements) “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief,” 
which must be taken as true in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.28 
Historically and in connection with the Letter, Title IX has been thought to be 
 
 19. Compare id. at 588–89 (refusing to analogize the pleading standard for Title VII claims with 
that of Title IX claims), with Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 2016) (modifying the 
Title IX pleading standard to the extent the Title VII standard is modified). 
 20. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 604–05. 
 21. See Emily D. Safko, Note, Are Campus Sexual Assault Tribunals Fair?: The Need for Judicial 
Review and Additional Due Process Protections in Light of New Case Law, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 
2316–20 (2016). 
 22. 550 U.S. 544, 554–63 (2007). 
 23. Id. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 
 24. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 25. Id. (first quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; and then citing id. at 555). 
 26. Id. at 679 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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a statute that protects victims of sexual misconduct.29 However, in this context, 
alleged perpetrators of sexual misconduct who claim discrimination in their 
campus hearings invoke Title IX. In reverse Title IX cases, the post-Iqbal pleading 
standard grants universities a safety net at the pleading stage by requiring students 
to put forth factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss.30 This is because 
students are generally unable to support allegations of gender discrimination with 
facts that give rise to an entitlement of relief.31 One glaring cause of this 
procedural predicament that accused students, like John in Doe v. Miami 
University, face at the pleading stage is that the “best information for discerning 
whether alleged discrimination was based on the plaintiff’s gender as opposed to 
his status as an accused student is generally in the possession” of the university.32 
Specifically, the outcomes of previous sexual assault allegations at the university 
in question and whether the accused was male or female are closely held by the 
university as confidential.33 More generally, information indicating whether the 
university has developed a pattern of finding males disproportionately responsible 
for sexual misconduct is also kept confidential by universities. 
IV.  CIRCUIT SPLIT IN THE APPLICATION OF THE PLEADING 
STANDARD 
In Doe v. Miami University, the Sixth Circuit took note of the Second Circuit’s 
modified pleading standard for reverse Title IX claims in Doe v. Columbia University 
but ultimately rationalized its decision with its own precedent in Keys v. Humana, 
Inc.34 In Keys, the Sixth Circuit reversed a dismissal of a Title VII racial 
discrimination claim in which the district court held the plaintiff had “failed to 
allege plausibly that she was treated differently than similarly situated 
nonprotected employees.”35 The court recognized that, at least in Title VII claims, 
“discovery may produce direct evidence of discrimination” that would otherwise 
not be available at the pleading stage.36 The Keys Court went on to read the 
plaintiff’s pleadings to assert that her factual allegations of racial discrimination 
were “neither speculative nor conclusory.”37 Specifically, the court reasoned that 
the alleged facts “easily state[d] a plausible claim” without the plaintiff offering 
actual evidentiary proof to substantiate her allegations.38 
The allegations of racial discrimination in Keys parallel the allegations of sex 
 
 29. See, e.g., Naomi M. Mann, Taming Title IX Tensions, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 633–34 
(2018) (“Title IX codifies the societal interest in protecting victims against certain types of 
discrimination and requires schools to provide an equal access to education. This mandate aims to 
redress the educational harms caused by sex discrimination . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 30. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588–89 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 31. See id. 
 32. Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 187 (D.R.I. 2016). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 588–89 (citing Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609–10 
(6th Cir. 2012)). 
 35. Keys, 684 F.3d at 608. 
 36. Id. at 609 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002)). 
 37. Id. at 610. 
 38. Id. 
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discrimination in Doe v. Miami University.39 The Sixth Circuit failed to see the 
similarities in the evidentiary problems accused students face in gender 
discrimination claims against their universities and the problems the plaintiff in 
Keys faced when accusing her employer of racial discrimination.40 The Second 
Circuit filled this gap in Doe v. Columbia University by identifying that the analysis 
of Title VII claims is similar in application to Title IX claims, asserting that 
“[a]llegations of a causal connection in the case of university disciplinary cases can 
be of the kind that are found in the familiar setting of Title VII cases.”41 The 
Second Circuit relied on the ruling in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,42 in which 
the Supreme Court established a temporary presumption requiring the defendant 
to show a nondiscriminatory motive before summary judgment.43 Courts shift the 
burden to defendants because the nature of the claim invites a lack of evidence 
available to plaintiffs before discovery.44 In applying this line of reasoning to 
reverse Title IX cases, the Second Circuit made clear their role is “not in any way 
to evaluate the truth as to what really happened, but merely to determine whether 
the plaintiff’s factual allegations are sufficient to allow the case to proceed.”45 
Again, the presumption only operates temporarily because “the facts may appear 
in a very different light once [the] [d]efendant . . . has had the opportunity to 
contest the [p]laintiff’s allegations and present its own version.”46 
The Second Circuit also drew upon its own earlier opinion in Littlejohn v. City 
of New York, which further explains that the temporary presumption “reduces the 
facts a plaintiff would need to show to defeat a motion for summary judgment 
prior to the defendant’s furnishing of a non-discriminatory motivation.”47 The 
Littlejohn Court provided a template for courts to follow in order to protect 
plaintiffs from early-stage dismissal for lack of evidence when dealing with 
discrimination allegations.48 Under Littlejohn, “in the first phase of the case, the 
prima facie requirements are relaxed” to allow the plaintiff to “establish a prima 
facie case without evidence sufficient to show discriminatory motivation.”49 If the 
defendant gives a justification other than discrimination for the result complained 
of, then “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the 
true reason” for the complained-of injury.50 If the Second Circuit’s standard was 
applied to the facts of Doe v. Miami University, the burden-shifting analysis might 
have granted John an opportunity to reach the merits of his claim against the 
university. 
 
 39. Compare Keys, 684 F.3d at 610, with Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589–95. 
 40. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589. 
 41. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714–15 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 42. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 59. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 54 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of 
New York, 795 F.3d 297, 310 (2d Cir. 2015)). 
 48. Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 307. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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V.  FUTURE OF TITLE IX ON CAMPUS 
It is important to note that universities may have the ability to correct course 
in the future. The Department of Education officially rescinded portions of the 
Letter in 2017.51 The Education Department released interim guidelines on how 
OCR will assess Title IX compliance in a “Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct” 
letter to universities.52 The new interim guidelines grant universities the flexibility 
to raise their standards for fact-finding in disciplinary hearings from 
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence in order to 
produce a more equitable investigation.53 Accusations of sexual assault must 
always be taken seriously, but these new guidelines may offer students in John’s 
situation the due process they deserve when accused of misconduct. Only time 
will tell if the Department of Education’s new stance on Title IX will reduce the 
number of reverse gender discrimination cases brought against universities. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit in Doe v. Miami University erred in refusing to modify its 
pleading standard for reverse Title IX claims against universities.54 The court’s 
failure to shift the burden to the university to provide some other, 
nondiscriminatory motive for John’s suspension effectively slams the door on 
accused plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit that have possibly been “falsely convicted” 
by their university. In allowing students to pursue reverse Title IX claims by 
surviving a motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit curtailed this potential 
injustice.55 As it stands, the federal pleading standard inevitability serves as a force 
field around universities, which have set up ad hoc courts in an attempt to appease 
OCR’s initiative to reduce sexual misconduct on campus. 
While the intention of OCR and universities is to reduce sexual violence and 
gender discrimination on campus, the response to the Letter invites the opposite. 
A campus disciplinary hearing is not a criminal proceeding, and the decision-
makers are not lawyers or judges. However, the effects are as damning as a guilty 
verdict. Obviously and without question, it is hard to imagine something more 
abhorrent than sexual assault, and those who are responsible should be 
prosecuted. However, without the ability to survive the motion-to-dismiss stage, it 
is more likely that innocent parties will be left without recourse. For these reasons, 
regardless of whether the Department of Education’s new guidelines provide 
better protection to all students, the responsibility rests with our judicial system 
in cases like Doe v. Miami University to allow students who believe they have been 
discriminated against to challenge their university proceeding. 
 
 51. See Office for Civil Rights, Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 
2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CAX5-TULW]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588–89 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 55. See Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). 
